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was notified of litigation concerning a given transaction, he came
within the purview of the rule. 7
Although both CPLR 203(e) and federal rule 15(c) emphasize
the facts of the case giving rise to the original and amended
pleadings, it would appear from the language of both statutes that
the New York provision should be more liberally construed.
Yet, pre-CPLR cases had held that amendments to assert claims
against third-party defendants after the original statute of limitaThe federal courts, in
tions had run did not relate back.
interpreting rule 15 (c), however, reached more liberal results. 9
In Tryb us, the dissenting judge would have applied CPLR
203(e) to the instant case since appellant, in actuality, had "notice
of the transaction" precisely within the language of this provision.
It would appear that, in cases such as Trybus, the purpose of
CPLR 203(e) should be to protect third-party defendants from
surprise. In order to effectuate this purpose, the New York
courts should adopt the federal interpretation of rule 15(c) and
view change-in-party problems as depending upon timely notice to
the ultimate defendant of the factual disputes that will be involved
in the litigation. What the court should do under CPLR 203(e)
is look at the original pleading and determine whether it gives
notice to the defendant broad enough to embrace the matter sought
to be added by way of amendment.
CPLR 203(f): Amendnwnt.
CPLR 203 (f) has been amended by the insertion of: "Except
as provided in article 2 of the uniform commercial code." Section
2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides a four-year
statute of limitations for actions for breach of sales contracts.
This section states, inter alia, that where a warranty explicitly
extends to future performance of goods and discovery of the
breach must await performance, an action for breach of warranty
accrues when discovery is or should have been made. Therefore,
the effect of this amendment will be to retain the four-year statute
of limitations for breach of warranty from time of discovery and
not limit it to two years under 203(f).
3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE [ 15.15, at 1022-23 (2d ed. 1965).
8 See McCabe v. Queensboro Farm Prods., Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 553,
223 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2d Dep't 1961), aff'd without opinion, 11 N.Y2d
963, 183 N.E.2d 326, 229 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1962); Spen & Co. v. Ocean Box
Corp., 16 Misc. 2d 436, 184 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1959).
9See, e.g., De Franco v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 156 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
Here, a suit was commenced by one partner for a refund of taxes paid by
the partnership. Joinder of the remaining partners after the period of
limitations had expired was allowed since defendant had notice from the
beginning that a partnership claim for a tax refund was involved.
7
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CPLR 203(f) now expressly defers to the Uniform Commercial Code's four-year period for sales contracts. Before the
amendment, it also deferred, but under the more general terms
of CPLR 101. Problems can be expected when the courts are
asked to determine whether the contract involved is a sales contract
within the meaning of the UCC.
CPLR 204(a): No stay in action involving fire insurance policy.
CPLR 204(a) provides that where commencement of an
action has been stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition, the
statute of limitations is tolled for the duration of the stay. In
Proc v. Home Ins. Co.,' 0 plaintiff's premises were insured by
standard fire insurance policies which provided that: (1) insured
must file proof of loss within sixty days of insurer's demand;"
(2) the claim would be payable sixty days after proof of loss ;12

and (3) no suit could be commenced unless all the requirements
of the policy were met and unless such action was commenced
within twelve months from the "inception of the loss."' 3 The
premises were partially destroyed by fire in November, 1962, but
plaintiff failed to commence his cause of action until February,
1964. He had filed proof-of-loss papers in May, 1963, two months
after the defendant's demand.
The plaintiff argued that since the insurer was allowed sixty
days after proof of loss within which to satisfy the claim, and since
Section 168(6) of the Insurance Law required that he comply
with all the terms of the contract before his cause of action accrued,
the commencement of the twelve-month period in which to bring
the action was tolled by CPLR 204(a) until the accrual of the
cause of action.
However, the Court of Appeals held that Section 168(6) of
the Insurance Law was not the type of statutory prohibition
contemplated by CPLR 204(a), and concluded that the statute
of limitations began running at the time of the fire and not at the
time the cause of action accrued.' 4 The Court stated that it would
not rewrite nearly ninety years of legislative history and subvert
the clear legislative intent "by deriving from the less specific terms

17 N.Y.2d 239, 217 N.E.2d 136, 270 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1966).
"1N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 168(6), 172. Section 168(6) contains the standard
fire policy form which is required to be used within New York.
10

N.Y. INs. LAW § 168(6).
"3Ibid.
14 For a case treating this legislation and its history, see Marguilies v.
Quaker City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 276 App. Div. 695, 97 N.Y.S.2d 100
(lst Dep't 1950).
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